On October 7, 41 Hamas terrorists stormed the Israeli city of Sderot, killing 53 people, including 37 civilians, 11 police officers, 3 Israel Defense Forces (IDF) soldiers, and 2 firefighters
One of the most memorable moments of this tragedy, which has remained etched in the memory of Israelis, was the destruction of the Sderot police station.
The building was so badly damaged during the 24-hour confrontation with the terrorists that it had to be completely demolished afterwards.
On the morning of that day, thousands of Hamas terrorists broke through the barriers on the Gaza border, overcame Israeli defenses, and advanced deep into Israeli territory.
One of the main targets was Sderot, a city of about 30,000 inhabitants located just one kilometer from the border.
The following Wednesday, the Israel Defense Forces released an investigation into what happened in Sderot.
The report found that the army had “misconceptions and failures” in defending the city.
The investigation showed that the Northern Brigade, part of the Gaza Division and responsible for security in that area, bore a large share of the blame for the failure.
They did not even have a defense plan for the city, which went against their orders.
As a result, there were no clear procedures for how to protect Sderot in an emergency.
The report says: “Sderot is in the Northern Brigade’s area of “”operation, but on October 7, no brigade forces showed up.” The investigation concluded that the army had “misconceptions and failures accumulated over the years,” which left the troops unprepared to prevent the attack.
The blame fell on the Northern Brigade, the Gaza Division and the Operations Division.
But the city itself was also not ready for an invasion.
The few security measures that did exist were weakened shortly before the attack.
In August 2022, for example, the decision was made to remove all of the city’s emergency response teams’ rifles because there was no proper weapons depot.
When the terrorists arrived, the team members had to fight with only pistols against enemies armed with rocket-propelled grenades and rocket-propelled grenades.
Furthermore, in the two years leading up to the attack, the emergency response team had not trained to deal with an invasion.
Despite all this, there was one small success: no Sderot residents were kidnapped, and the 41 Hamas terrorists were killed or captured.
Even so, the army was unprepared to defend the city and was slow to react.
The first troops did not arrive until an hour and a half after the invasion began.
Other problems made the situation worse.
The city’s emergency response team did not have adequate weapons, and there was no unified command structure.
The city’s control center went down early in the morning, making it difficult to understand the severity of the attack.
Videos circulating on social media caused panic, prompting about a thousand soldiers to rush to Sderot.
But without an organized command, these soldiers were not put to good use and could have been used elsewhere.
Many were trapped in the city because the roads to the south were blocked.
If there had been a functioning command, the streets within the city could have been closed to limit the terrorists’ movements.
The investigation found that if an alert had been given when the terrorists entered the area of “”the security fence, it would have been possible to position forces to block the entrances to the city and prevent the attacks.
How it all began
The invasion of Sderot began around 7 a.m.
The Hamas terrorists entered the city in two main groups, using their famous white pickup trucks, which advanced along Begin Avenue.
Soon after, the first videos of these heavily armed terrorists began circulating on social media, alerting the country that something very serious was happening in the south.
One of the groups, with about nine terrorists, attacked and killed several elderly people at a bus stop.
They then proceeded to the Mall 7 shopping center, attempting to take it over.
There, they encountered an elite team of Yamam border police, who killed three terrorists while the others fled.
At the same time, other terrorists raided residential neighborhoods of Sderot and killed several people.
By midday, army and police forces, assembled from several different units, had managed to control most of the city, except for the local police station.
The attack on the police station
The main group of terrorists, numbering 26, went straight to the police station.
Upon arrival, they killed three police officers outside and stormed the building.
As the police officers attempted to climb to the roof, one of them killed four terrorists.
Other police officers barricaded themselves on the roof and called for help.
Shortly after, a team of six police officers arrived at the police station and began fighting the terrorists.
More than an hour later, a second unit arrived and entered the building, but one of the officers was killed.
It was only two hours after the start of the confrontation that a commando unit arrived on the scene.
After another hour, this force stormed the police station and rescued several wounded police officers, including those on the roof.
The shooting continued for hours.
Then, the Yamam unit began a procedure called “pressure cooker”, completely surrounding the building and gradually increasing the intensity of the attack, including using heavy artillery and air strikes.
An escape attempt by the terrorists was foiled, and several of them were killed.
During the night, the remaining terrorists tried to escape, but tanks and bulldozers arrived and systematically destroyed the building.
In the end, all the terrorists in the police station were eliminated within 24 hours.
About 16 Israelis died in this battle, including 10 police officers and 6 civilians.
Investigation findings
The investigation concluded that “the army failed in its mission.” The report said that the Israel Defense Forces were not prepared for a large-scale surprise attack.
There was no well-structured defense – not for a company, not for a battalion, not for a brigade.
Everything depended on the border fence, and there were no plans to deal with a large-scale invasion.
The army needs to find quick solutions for such a situation.
Another conclusion was that “the city of Sderot needs a permanent force to protect it.” The lack of preparation, the delay in response and the command errors made the tragedy even worse, making it clear that changes are necessary to prevent something like this from happening again.
Published in 04/10/2025 14h36
Text adapted by AI (Grok) and translated via Google API in the English version. Images from public image libraries or credits in the caption.
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