On October 7, 2023, in the early hours of the morning, a mechanism created by the then chief of staff of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), Herzi Halevi, influenced decisions that left the military system unprepared for Hamas’ surprise attack
This method, developed throughout Halevi’s career, had the main objective of protecting sensitive intelligence sources so as not to “burn” them.
However, on that fateful night, he contributed to the Army acting with excessive caution and not reacting with the necessary urgency.
Halevi, with his vast experience in intelligence, has always prioritized the preservation of sources.
He had commanded sensitive operations, including in the elite Sayeret Matkal unit, and understood the high cost of building and maintaining covert access for enemies like Hezbollah and Hamas.
For him, knowledge was power, and exposing sources prematurely could compromise future advantages.
The night before the attack, suspicious signals began arriving: activation of SIM cards linked to terrorists from Hamas’s elite Nukhba unit.
At around 3:20 a.m., Halevi’s chief of staff woke him up.
The initial intelligence assessment was reassuring: everything indicated that Hamas was in routine mode.
Halevi, however, did not go back to sleep.
He asked to speak to Southern region commander Yaron Finkelman and made notes: “Don’t think this is anything.” He was especially concerned about possible infiltrations from the sea at Zikim beach and about a Hamas offensive tunnel that penetrated Israeli territory.
During the conversation, which lasted about half an hour, the officers analyzed the evidence.
It was decided to discreetly reinforce some positions, without fanfare, so as not to alert the enemy and preserve the sources.
Halevi approved the sending of an extra drone, reinforcements on the beach and in the tunnel, and advised: “If something happens, it will be in the morning.
Welcome the morning with strength.” However, the general tone of the guidance was one of extreme caution: avoid any visible movement that could “expose” intelligence sources, such as monitored SIM cards.
This approach reflected a long-standing dilemma in military intelligence.
Preserving sources is crucial, but using them too narrowly can cost lives.
Historical examples, such as the Enigma case in World War II or failures in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, show how fear of losing sources can delay vital alerts.
Halevi, who developed a “mechanism” to manage this – mediating information in a partial and controlled way – applied this logic that night.
The result was that orders for reinforcements were not fully carried out, and the system remained in low visibility mode.
The article reveals that Hamas was a difficult target for intelligence, unlike Hezbollah.
Even with risky efforts approved by Halevi, penetration into the Palestinian group was limited.
SIM cards represented a valuable and expensive resource, built over years, and no one wanted to lose it easily.
In retrospect, factors such as misconceptions about Hamas, political instructions to remain calm, and Halevi’s own culture of caution contributed to the tragedy.
Specific orders from the Chief of Staff were not fully executed, and the morning came with the mass invasion that no one imagined on its full scale.
This story, based on investigations and reports from inside sources, highlights how the delicate balance between protecting secrets and acting decisively can, at critical moments, make all the difference.
The mechanism that Halevi perfected to preserve intelligence advantages ended up, that morning, putting the system that should have been on high alert to sleep.
Published in 06/05/2026 12h09
Text adapted by AI (Grok) and translated via Google API in the English version. Images from public image libraries or credits in the caption.
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